Can RIC become a stabilising force in a turbulent world in Trump 2.0 Era—or will its internal contradictions prevent it from moving beyond diplomatic optics?

President Trump’s unilateralism in his second term and the geopolitical climate visible in 18th BRICS Summit at Bharat Mandapam has renewed attention on the Russia–India–China (RIC) triangle. In a world shaped by US–China strategic competition, Trumps flip flops in tariffs and energy policies, the Russia–Ukraine war, instability in West Asia, energy insecurity and contested global institutions, cooperation among Moscow, New Delhi and Beijing appears to offer fresh possibilities.

Yet geopolitical convergence must not be confused with strategic alignment. Russia’s interests, China’s ambitions and India’s strategic priorities overlap on selected issues but diverge sharply on others. The unresolved India–China boundary question, competing visions of Asian security and the continuing importance of India’s economic and strategic engagement with the West impose clear limits.

The central question is therefore not whether RIC should be revived as a bloc, but whether it can serve as a flexible platform for issue-based cooperation, crisis management and a more balanced international order.

Three world leaders engaging in a handshake and conversation against a blue background.

A similar analysis was authored by me and published in WION News on October 7, 2026. I am presenting my updated detailed analysis below covering additional factors.

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RIC After BRICS 2026: Can Russia, India and China Stabilise a Turbulent World?

The turbulence caused by Trump 2.0 led America and geopolitical climate in BRICS 2026 has renewed the relevance of the Russia–India–China (RIC) triangle, but strategic convergence is not strategic alignment. For India, RIC must remain a calibrated instrument of strategic autonomy, not an emerging geopolitical bloc.

Major General (Dr) S B Asthana, SM, VSM (Retd)

“RIC is useful to India only so long as India remains its architect and never becomes its junior partner.”

Backdrop: From BRICS to RIC

The 18th BRICS Summit at Bharat Mandapam has renewed attention on the Russia–India–China (RIC) triangle at a time when the international order is experiencing strategic turbulence in Trump 2.0 era, marred by American unilateralism and Chinese responses in Cold War 2.0. The Russia–Ukraine war, instability in West Asia, intensifying US–China competition, weaponisation of economic interdependence and uncertainty surrounding traditional partnerships have reinforced the importance of flexible diplomatic arrangements.

The question is whether RIC can move beyond diplomatic symbolism to contribute meaningfully to global stability. My assessment is that the prospects are real, but bounded by the divergent interests of its three members.

In my November 2025 interview with the Foreign Policy Research Centre (FPRC), Focus: India between Russia and China (RIC), I examined India’s pivotal position amid renewed engagement between Prime Minister Narendra Modi, President Vladimir Putin and President Xi Jinping. The central challenge remains unchanged: India must engage both continental powers without allowing either to constrain its strategic choices.

The subsequent evolution of Cold War 2.0 makes this balancing act even more consequential. The emerging order is neither a clean bipolar contest nor a settled multipolar system. It is a fragmented strategic environment in which great powers compete, remain economically interdependent and seek tactical accommodation when the costs of confrontation become excessive.

BRICS 2026: Consensus, Not a Blo

The outcome of BRICS 2026 should be understood as calibrated diplomacy rather than the consolidation of an anti-Western coalition. The summit declaration addressed concerns relevant to different members, including critical-mineral security, the Ukraine conflict, terrorism, international transit, energy flows, unilateral sanctions and economic coercion.

India’s approach reflects an important diplomatic principle: give every member sufficient reason to remain engaged without surrendering national priorities to collective pressure.

As I have argued, “India gave every member something and no member everything.”

This distinction matters. BRICS brings together countries with different political systems, economic dependencies, security priorities and relationships with the United States and Europe. Their opposition to particular unilateral measures does not translate automatically into agreement on a common strategic order.

India’s position is therefore best described as non-Western but not anti-Western. New Delhi can oppose punitive tariffs, resist unilateral coercion and support reforms in global governance while continuing to engage Washington, European capitals and Indo-Pacific partners.

RIC must be judged by the same standard. Its value lies not in creating another bloc, but in enabling selective cooperation where national interests converge.

https://asthanawrites.org/2026/09/09/global-turbulence-and-the-testing-of-brics-2026-indias-balancing-act-at-bharat-mandapam/

BRICS 2026: A Declaration Written for Many Capitals

The declaration is best read as a set of messages, each addressed to a capital. To China: no weaponisation of critical minerals. To Russia: support for an end to the war, with expanding trade left as a sovereign decision of each member. To Pakistan: condemnation of the Pahalgam attack. To Iran: no obstruction of smooth transit. To Washington: no de-dollarisation agenda and no anti-West posture, yet a firm objection to unilateral sanctions, economic coercion and punitive tariffs. Unimpeded energy flows and protection of infrastructure and seafarers were reaffirmed.

This is calibrated activism at work. India gave every member something and no member everything. It will have to be seen as to how China navigates these messages as it takes over the Presidency of BRICS from India.

Why RIC Has Regained Strategic Relevance

Three structural developments explain the renewed interest in RIC.

First, US–China competition has intensified strategic uncertainty. Tariffs, technology restrictions, supply-chain vulnerabilities, military signalling and contestation over global institutions have become instruments of statecraft. Yet Washington and Beijing remain deeply interconnected economically, technologically and financially. This is the paradox of Cold War 2.0: adversarial coexistence under conditions of mutual dependence.

Second, uncertainty in Western policy has encouraged many countries to diversify their external relationships. When economic access, energy supplies or technology partnerships become instruments of geopolitical pressure, strategic resilience requires multiple options. This does not mean abandoning existing partnerships; it means reducing excessive dependence on any single power.

Third, Russia, India and China occupy consequential positions across Eurasia. Their economic weight, energy interests, technological capabilities and diplomatic influence give them opportunities to cooperate on selected transnational challenges.

The BRICS 2026 discussions on artificial intelligence, trade facilitation, resilient supply chains, the Global South and energy security provide possible areas for such cooperation. Proposals for a BRICS-owned insurance mechanism could also merit examination as a means of diversifying commercial and energy-related risk, subject to practical feasibility and transparent safeguards.

However, common interests must not be mistaken for common strategic intentions. Cooperation on a particular issue does not require India to endorse the wider geopolitical ambitions of either Moscow or Beijing.

The Limits of the Triangle: India Cannot Ignore China as well as USA!

The greatest constraint on RIC is the unresolved contradiction between India’s relationship with China and the wider promise of trilateral cooperation.

India and China have overlapping interests in some multilateral forums, but they also have an unresolved boundary question, competing strategic visions of Asia and differences over regional influence. The thaw in bilateral engagement may create space for competitive coexistence; it does not eliminate the underlying security dilemma.

Economic engagement must therefore be calibrated against strategic vulnerability. Supply-chain diversification, critical-mineral security, technological resilience and border stability cannot be treated as separate policy compartments.

China’s diplomatic outreach and economic initiatives deserve objective assessment rather than automatic acceptance or rejection. As my earlier work on Xi Jinping’s evolving diplomatic approach has argued, Beijing combines long-term strategic continuity with an expanding capacity to shape international narratives and economic relationships. India must distinguish between initiatives that deliver reciprocal benefits and those that could create asymmetric dependence.

There is also a wider economic reality. BRICS members continue to depend substantially on markets, technology, finance and investment beyond the grouping. Intra-BRICS trade must expand if the institution is to translate its collective economic weight into greater practical resilience. But diversification should not become an attempt to replace one dependency with another.

Russia presents a different set of considerations. Its energy, defence and Eurasian connectivity relationships remain important to India, while the Ukraine conflict and Moscow’s deepening engagement with Beijing complicate the strategic picture. India must preserve its independent relationship with Russia without assuming that Russian and Indian priorities will always align.

RIC is therefore not a natural alliance. It is a potential mechanism for managing selected interests among three powers whose strategic calculations remain distinct. The reality remains:-

“The US–China competition is there to stay, and the rest of the world has to navigate carefully between pressure and prudence, rhetoric and reality, competition and coexistence”.

Infographic depicting geopolitical rivalry between the US and China, titled 'Trump, Xi and Cold War 2.0'. It features a world map highlighting key regions like Taiwan, Ukraine, West Asia, and the Indo-Pacific, with distinct sections for the US and China models, including concepts like alliances, military presence, and economic strategies.

Can RIC Help Stabilise Global Turbulence?

RIC can contribute to stability in four practical areas.

First, energy and economic security. India, Russia and China have significant energy interests, but their positions as producers, consumers and trading powers differ. Dialogue on reliable supplies, maritime security, infrastructure protection and commercial risk management could improve resilience. Any proposed insurance mechanism must be commercially viable, transparent and consistent with India’s wider economic relationships.

Second, Eurasian connectivity and crisis management. The three countries can explore practical cooperation on connectivity, trade facilitation and regional dialogue. Russia’s relationship with Europe, China’s continental and maritime ambitions, and India’s own connectivity priorities will continue to differ. Progress must consequently be project-specific rather than based on assumptions of geopolitical solidarity.

Third, artificial intelligence and technology governance. Open, inclusive and secure AI development, alongside resilient supply chains, offers scope for dialogue. India should support arrangements that preserve human oversight, protect national security and prevent excessive dependence on external technology ecosystems. Cooperation should be evaluated on standards, implementation and reciprocal benefit, not merely on declarations.

Fourth, diplomatic engagement on major conflicts. RIC members could use their individual relationships to encourage dialogue over Ukraine and other crises. Such facilitation would require acceptance by the parties concerned and a realistic understanding of their security interests. No trilateral declaration can substitute for the difficult work of conflict resolution.

These possibilities are meaningful, but RIC will not stabilise the world merely by issuing joint statements. Its credibility will depend on whether it can deliver measurable outcomes without exporting internal disagreements into other forums.

India’s Calibrated Agenda: Autonomy Without Isolation

India should pursue four complementary lines of effort.

First, keep RIC issue-based rather than institutionalised as a strategic bloc. Energy security, Eurasian connectivity, AI governance and crisis-management dialogue offer useful starting points. Cooperation should remain flexible enough to accommodate differences.

Second, insist that progress in India–China relations be accompanied by tangible movement towards border normalisation and mutual security. Diplomatic engagement and economic opportunities are valuable, but they cannot replace trust, reciprocity and stability along the frontier.

Third, engage constructively with Russian proposals that could strengthen India’s energy, commercial and defence-technological resilience. Every initiative should be assessed for feasibility, long-term costs and compatibility with India’s broader partnerships.

Fourth, keep the Western channel open. India’s relationships with the United States, Europe, Japan, Australia and other partners serve important economic, technological, maritime and security interests. Participation in RIC should complement these relationships, not undermine them.

This is the essence of strategic autonomy: retaining the freedom to cooperate with different powers on different issues without becoming strategically subordinate to any of them.

India must also guard against the possibility of a US–China accommodation that marginalises the interests of other countries. Equally, a sharper confrontation between Washington and Beijing could impose economic and security costs on India. In either scenario, diversified partnerships, domestic technological capacity and economic resilience remain essential.

Conclusion: India Must Remain the Architect

RIC’s prospects after BRICS 2026 are neither negligible nor transformative by themselves. The triangle can create diplomatic space, support selected economic and technological initiatives and offer additional channels for crisis management. Its limitations, however, are substantial: unresolved India–China tensions, competing ambitions, external economic dependencies and the absence of a shared strategic vision.

The lesson from BRICS 2026 is that consensus can preserve engagement without requiring uniformity. RIC should apply the same principle.

India can work with Russia and China where interests converge, disagree where national priorities diverge and continue strengthening its relationships with the West and other partners. That is not strategic ambiguity; it is deliberate strategic choice in a fragmented international system.

The emerging order will not be stabilised by replacing one dominant bloc with another. It requires resilient economies, credible deterrence, flexible diplomacy and mechanisms that reduce the risk of miscalculation.

RIC is best understood as a lever of Indian strategic autonomy—not a destination in itself. India must remain its architect, never its junior partner.

About the Author

Major General (Dr) S B Asthana, SM, VSM, PhD ( Veteran)

The views expressed are the personal views of the author, who retains copyright. The author is a globally acknowledged strategic and security analyst, and former Director General of Infantry, Indian Army, and former Director at the United Service Institution of India. A prolific strategic-affairs commentator with over 600 published works and more than 5,000 global TV appearances, he writes on geopolitics, military doctrine and defence policy.

Website: Asthana Writes

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The views expressed are personal.

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