From Sea Lanes to Strategic Fault-lines: Big Power Contestation and Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean Is No Longer Just a Trade Route—It Is Becoming the World’s Most Consequential Strategic Battle-space.

From the Strait of Hormuz to the Strait of Malacca, the waters that sustain global commerce and energy flows are increasingly becoming arenas of geopolitical competition, grey-zone coercion and maritime contestation.

As major powers extend their strategic reach beneath the threshold of war, the future of global stability may well be determined not on continental battlefields, but across the sea lanes and chokepoints of the Indian Ocean.

“The future of the Indian Ocean will not be decided by decisive battles, but by those who master persistence—presence, partnerships, and preparedness in the grey zones below war.”

I am pleased to share that my latest peer-reviewed research article, “From Sea Lanes to Strategic Fault Lines: Big Power Contestation and Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean,” has been published in the latest edition of the Journal of Indian Ocean Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (January–April 2026). ISSN 0972-3080.

The study examines how the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is evolving from a traditional maritime transit zone into a theatre of great-power competition, grey-zone contestation, strategic signalling and maritime coercion. The research analyses emerging challenges arising from geopolitical rivalry, growing Chinese maritime presence, vulnerabilities of critical chokepoints, the implications of the Strait of Hormuz crisis, the strategic relevance of Diego Garcia, and India’s preparedness to safeguard a stable and rules-based maritime order.

The article argues that future competition in the Indian Ocean is unlikely to be decided through conventional naval battles alone. Instead, it will increasingly be shaped by persistent presence, maritime domain awareness, strategic infrastructure, partnerships, legal positioning, and the ability to operate effectively in the grey zones below the threshold of armed conflict.

For India—the only nation in the world with an ocean bearing its name—the challenge is not merely to respond to evolving developments, but to proactively shape the maritime environment in accordance with its long-term strategic interests.

To facilitate reading I am reproducing the entire text below:-

From Sea Lanes to Strategic Faultlines: Big Power Contestation and Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean

Abstract

This paper analyses the transformation of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) into a theatre of grey-zone contestation and great power competition. It demonstrates how initiatives like continuous surveillance, seabed mapping, and deployment of dual-use vessels are changing the maritime environment below the conventional war threshold. As evidenced by events like the IRIS Dena incident, the growing influence of powerful nations , especially China and the United States, has heightened competition and raised the possibility of escalation. The analysis emphasises how crucial the IOR is for smooth flow of international trade and energy, with important chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca emerging as serious concerns. It assesses India’s readiness, pointing out inadequacies in institutional coordination, legal positioning, and maritime domain awareness in order to promote a stable, rules-based order in the Indian Ocean. The paper promotes a proactive maritime strategy focused on alliances, regional leadership, and persistent presence.

1. Introduction: The New Battlespace Below the Threshold.

The ongoing U.S.-Israel war on Iran and the choking of the Strait of Hormuz have highlighted the vulnerability of choke points and resultant challenges related to the security of the Indian Ocean. The ‘Big Power Contestation’ is undergoing a fundamental transformation in the maritime domain. Grey-zone tactics, which involves actions above peacetime but below the limit of armed conflict, remaining at sub conventional level are gradually replacing conventional maritime warfare, defined by conclusive kinetic actions and contact warfare.

The Indian Ocean is increasingly becoming a zone of contestation in big power competition. Major powers continue to be attracted to it because of its relevance to international trade, energy flows, and connectivity. Without initiating a conflict, actions like the deployment of surveillance ships, research vessels, and underwater mapping platforms are influencing the maritime peace.

Historically, for centuries (except the last three centuries), India had been a leading global economic power by utilising the Indian Ocean to its fullest advantage as a major maritime power. Currently, while the country aspires to be “Viksit Bharat” by 2047 and a “net security provider,” the evolving nature of threats demands new approaches, capabilities, and doctrinal clarity to achieve its goals.

2. Strategic Context: New Trends in Maritime Threats

The expanding presence of extra-regional powers and changing patterns of maritime competition are driving greater strategic contestation in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). China’s growing involvement is a deliberate attempt to create a long-term operational presence, as seen by the regular deployment of research and surveillance vessels, port access agreements, and dual-use infrastructure. In light of the recent developments in Chagos Archipelago’s situation, the United States is  also strengthening its posture and refocusing on critical nodes like Diego Garcia. The expanding arc of West Asian tensions into the IOR is highlighted by recent events, such as Iranian signalling their reach by missile fire towards Diago Garcia  and incidents involving Iranian naval platforms being targeted in the Indian Ocean. From wider perspective, these patterns show that the area is rapidly becoming an extension of extra regional conflicts rather than being isolated from them.

The growth of dual-use maritime platforms is one of the significant feature of this competition. The employment of research boats for strategic reconnaissance, collecting undersea and acoustic data with urgent military applications, is growing. As a result, seabed mapping has emerged as a crucial instrument for underwater surveillance and submarine operations, signifying a shift toward the domination of subsurface data.

These changes are supported by growing maritime infrastructure, easier access to logistics, and improvements in surveillance technologies, all of which lead to a continuous and networked operational presence. As a result, there is increasing overlap between the military and civilian domains, making the maritime environment more complex. Overall, these developments are making the IOR a contentious maritime space. Even routine deployments or isolated incidents can have strategic ramifications due to the presence and conflicting interests of various parties , which increases the danger of accidental triggers.

3. Relevance of the Indian Ocean.

Geographically, the Indian Ocean connects Africa, Asia and the Australian continent as well as the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.  It links the energy-rich Gulf region, the maritime transit route through the Red Sea, with the industrial economies of East Asia and the markets of Europe. More than 35 countries border the Indian Ocean, including emerging and volatile democracies of East Africa, evolving Indonesia on its western shores, violence-prone nations of the Horn of Africa, and the geopolitical challenges of the Gulf region. The ocean encompasses fast-developing economies such as India and Southeast Asia, wealthy nations in the West, and politically unstable neighbours like Pakistan. India stands as a rising power, while some Western countries, notably France, possess real estate in the region.

Increasingly, the region is gaining importance as a theatre for strategic deterrence. Strategically, the Indian Ocean is the most nuclearised among the world’s oceans. Navies from nuclear powers such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, India, and Israel regularly operate in these waters.  The increasing militarisation of maritime spaces indicates that the Indian Ocean is no longer peripheral to global power politics—it is central to it.

Over 90% of global trade and two-thirds of oil supplies are transported by sea, with 40% of seaborne crude oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz and 50% of the world’s merchant fleet hosted in the Strait of Malacca. The main oil shipping lanes and important naval navigational choke points like the straits of Bab El Mandeb, Hormuz, and Malacca indicate the Indian Ocean’s crucial role in global trade. Every year, some 90,000 ships pass through the Malacca Strait. Submarine cables that are essential for connectivity are housed there. In addition, drug trafficking and smuggling are well-known in the area, and piracy is still very common.

Given the fact that a significant amount of India’s trade and energy imports pass via these waterways, the Indian Ocean is extremely important to the country. Therefore, the security of maritime communication routes is essential for both national security and economic stability.

4. Typology of Emerging Threats.

China in the Indian Ocean

China’s demand for energy motivates both its foreign policy and national security policy. It approaches the Indian Ocean as a landlocked power, actively seeking ports to secure access to the ocean. Over the past decade, China has consistently expanded its maritime presence in the Indian Ocean littoral, employing a combination of continuous naval deployments, arms sales, the establishment of bases and access facilities, intensified military diplomacy, and the fostering of special political relations with coastal nations. Additionally, China has utilised developmental finance as a strategic tool and has cited anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden to justify its increased presence and activities in the region.

Chinese navy and survey vessels have regularly operated in the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal, occasionally entering India’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) without prior notice, demonstrating this widespread tendency. In recent years, China’s economic and strategic connections with Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, and Malaysia in the eastern Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal have grown, indicating its expanding strategic clout in this region.

The aspirations of both China and India to achieve great power status and ensure energy security have prompted a strategic shift from a land-centric to a sea-centric focus. This ongoing maritime rivalry has intensified the geopolitical competition in the region, making the Indian Ocean the focal point of great power dynamics and strategic manoeuvring.

Although India has not encountered significant maritime threats since independence, the evolving situation in the Indian Ocean is raising new security concerns. As part of its “Belt and Road Initiative,” China is quickly becoming a major force in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), and the “Maritime Silk Road” has opened up new channels for military and commercial collaboration with neighbouring nations. In addition to challenging India’s strategic position, China’s expanding presence in the IOR is a component of Beijing’s larger goal to become a major maritime force in the world.

India’s security interests are seriously threatened by the growing power of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and China’s growing maritime connections with its neighbours and other IOR nations. These developments have compelled India to reassess its maritime strategy and reinforce its position in the Indian Ocean to safeguard national and regional stability.

Complications with UNCLOS

Violations/varied interpretation of governing laws for maritime traffic poses a serious challenge to maritime security, which is a concern in the Indian Ocean, too. The governance of chokepoints and maritime transit is anchored in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS[1]), which codifies rights and responsibilities across maritime zones.

UNCLOS allows full freedom of navigation (FON) for all states in high seas. In Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) too, the FON is retained, despite coastal rights  interpreted differently by many countries, and transit passage through straits cannot be legally suspended/taxed.  The Strait of Hormuz, therefore, being an international strait, cannot be lawfully blocked or transit passage controlled by any country.

The United States has frequently engaged in maritime adventurism, projecting naval power. Washington, despite its refusal to sign UNCLOS, continues to project maritime power across important international straits and chokepoints, assert FON, and conduct operations to impose its interpretation of international maritime conventions/laws. This proactive stance many times raises tensions, where other countries perceive such actions as provocations or challenge to their sovereignty. Incidents like strikes on  Iranian vessel exemplify that.

China, despite being a signatory, violates it frequently especially in case of South China Sea, and India maintains a balanced position, supporting navigation but adopts concerning stance on military activity by any foreign power in its EEZs. Thus, while UNCLOS provides a normative framework, chokepoint security ultimately rests on strategic capability and political will of concerned parties.

The IRIS Dena Episode

The IRIS Dena[2] sinking in March 2026 was an uncommon kinetic escalation that undermined established trust in maritime rules and multilateral security institutions and established a precedent for extra-regional military actions within the IOR. The strike did not violate UNCLOS because it took place in international waters outside of Indian coastal authority or the EEZ, where FON is applicable. Moreover, the Convention does not regulate the use of force. Therefore, the interpretation, the existence of a state of armed conflict, and the plausibility of any self-defence claims under Article 51 of the UN Charter[3] are the main topics of legal debate.

From Indian point of view, this episode exposed limitations in its maritime domain awareness (MDA) and its efficacy as a net security provider in the IOR. It also stressed India’s claim and power in exercising its policy of strategic autonomy, in adverse conditions.

Strategically, the IRIS Dena epoisode blurs the lines between grey-zone contestation and overt use of force, representing a form of contestation utilising legal inadequacies of conventions like UNCLOS. It highlighted the need for regional powers like India, to revisit their strategic postures and capabilities and restructure collective security arrangements and legal arrangements to address such threats to regional stability

Diego Garcia and the Chagos Controversy

Diego Garcia has been home to a joint US-UK military base since the 1970s, which has played a key strategic role as a hub for long-range bombers and ships, notably during the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and now in the war with Iran. It provides what American authorities have described as “an all but indispensable platform” for security operations in the Middle East, South Asia and East Africa.

After decades of negotiations, Britain signed an agreement[4] to cede sovereignty over the islands to the government of Mauritius in May 2025, on condition that a UK-US military base could continue operating on the largest island, Diego Garcia, for 99 years.

Early in 2026, President Trump denounced the deal as “total weakness” and “great stupidity,” but he eventually acknowledged the strategic importance of the 99-year lease, which provides strong defence against Chinese legal challenges in international courts by guaranteeing Mauritius upholds stringent “no-foreign-presence” regulations on the outer islands. To further complicate matters, the Maldives opposed to the treaty in February 2026 on the grounds of ongoing maritime border dispute with Mauritius. Nonetheless, India is still in favour of the accord in order to preserve Mauritius’ sovereignty.

The fact that Diago Garcia is being used in the war against Iran by the US Air Force and has attracted strikes from Iranian missiles (although not effective) means that this military base can attract confrontation from the Middle East to the Indian Ocean, threatening its peace.

Chokepoints Vulnerability and Energy Flow

As the main route for international energy flows connecting the hydrocarbon-rich Gulf with the main Asian consumption hubs, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is strategically significant. Nearly 20% of the world’s oil shipment travels through the Strait of Hormuz, a significant chokepoint. It is particularly vulnerable due to its narrow deep sea entrance, island dominance, and coastline features. Any disruption, whether caused by mining, blockade, or forced interdiction, has cumulative impact on the world’s energy markets, energy availability, and supply chains for all commodities related to energy.

The current crisis of Iran blocking the Strait of Hormuz[5] for the US, Israel and connected entities, together with the destruction of energy sources, has far-reaching global implications. It has caused sharp price spikes, supply chain bottlenecks, and inflationary pressure around the world. For India, the impact is especially serious because of its heavy reliance on oil imports from the Gulf. Such shocks strain strategic petroleum reserves, raise fiscal pressure, and make it urgent to diversify supply routes. Beyond the economic fallout, they also require greater naval deployments for escort missions and stronger maritime surveillance, pulling India more deeply into crisis management in the western Indian Ocean. A similar effect can be expected whenever the Houthis block Bab el-Mandeb, as they did in 2025.

A disruption in Hormuz could just as easily occur at another vital chokepoint, such as the Strait of Malacca. This would not only deepen China’s long-standing “Malacca dilemma” but also underline the strategic importance of Southeast Asian straits for all major powers. Alternative routes like Lombok and Sunda may become more important in such a scenario, but their limited capacity also reveals how fragile these backup options really are.

In a Hormuz-linked crisis, the Strait of Malacca[6] becomes even more significant for India. That means India would need to adopt a more proactive maritime posture through stronger domain awareness, regular presence operations, and closer coordination with regional partners. More broadly, the crisis shows why India must treat its western and eastern maritime theatres as connected rather than separate, so that trouble in one chokepoint does not create weakness in another. Energy chokepoints are no longer isolated geographic bottlenecks; they are linked strategic pressure points that demand advance planning and coordinated maritime strategy.

A positive lesson which emerges out of the Strait of Hormuz crisis is that the way Iran has used maritime geography as a force multiplier in retaliating to the aggression of a powerful adversary, the United States, India can also leverage the Malacca Strait to its strategic advantage, if faced with a similar adverse combat situation.

5. Relevance of Multilateral Cooperation to Address Threats in IOR

Given the escalating maritime risks, multilateral cooperation in the IOR has grown in recent years. These procedures offer forums for collaboration and show a shared commitment to a rules-based order. Additionally, they facilitate the development of smaller states’ capacities, which strengthens regional resilience. The following paragraphs discuss a few of these organisations and activities.

QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue)

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, comprising India, the US, Japan, and Australia, is a strategic coalition focused on a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific. It has expanded into maritime security, technology, and supply chain resilience. It’s a non- military coalition addressing non-kinetic challenges. Except for India, the other three members are defence partners.

Recent initiatives include the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA[7]) programme, enhancing real-time tracking of maritime activities. The QUAD’s relevance lies in ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific Region, security of sea lanes, especially across critical chokepoints in the Indian Ocean, without declaring to be against any particular country. With recent geopolitical events in the Middle East and around the world, the overdue Summit is yet to take place, indicating institutional inadequacies in meeting the challenges in Indo-Pacific.

Colombo Security Conclave (CSC)

The Colombo Security Conclave is a regional security architecture centred on the northern Indian Ocean, originally a trilateral (India–Sri Lanka–Maldives). It has now been expanded to include Mauritius, Bangladesh, and Seychelles. The NSA-level summit in New Delhi in 2025 strengthened collaboration in five areas: maritime security, cyber security, HADR and counterterrorism. It operationalises India’s leadership in the area by encouraging a cooperative security grid among smaller littoral governments, reducing need on outside aid, and increasing collective resilience.

IONS (Indian Ocean Naval Symposium)

The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium is an Indian Navy-led cooperative forum(established in 2008) bringing together Indian Ocean littoral navies to enhance interoperability and trust. As a platform for operational coordination and confidence-building, IONS is essential for coordinated responses to threats from the grey zone, piracy, and natural disasters. It operates through capacity-building programs, working groups, and biennial meetings. More than 30 nations participated in the 2026 Conclave of Chiefs in Visakhapatnam, which was held with MILAN and the International Fleet Review. The number of observers increased to include the Philippines. Deeper collaboration in HADR, marine security, and information exchange are among the results.

Naval Drills

Exercise MILAN is India’s flagship multilateral naval exercise. MILAN 2026, conducted with participation from dozens of countries and alongside the International Fleet Review, demonstrated large-scale multilateral naval coordination and operational synergy. Its outcome lies in building coalition capability and signalling India’s leadership. Naval exercises like Malabar, MILAN, and VARUNA improve interoperability, maritime domain awareness, and collective maritime security in the IOR.

BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation)

The BIMSTEC connects littoral governments in South and Southeast Asia and is gradually integrating marine security cooperation into its larger economic agenda. Particularly in the Bay of Bengal subregion, it focuses on disaster management, transnational crime, coastal security, and counterterrorism.

In addition to exercises and training related to maritime domain awareness, recent initiatives include bolstering coastal surveillance coordination and maritime cooperation structures. Its relevance lies in bridging SAARC–ASEAN gaps and providing India a sub-regional platform to secure the eastern Indian Ocean, counter illicit flows, and stabilise the Bay of Bengal—an increasingly contested maritime space.

IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association)

IORA is a 23-member intergovernmental organisationfocused on economic cooperation, but with increasing emphasis on maritime safety, blue economy, and security cooperation. Recent initiatives include cooperation on maritime safety, disaster risk reduction, and sustainable ocean governance.

SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region)

SAGAR, articulated by India in 2015, serves as the country’s comprehensive maritime doctrine. It is designed with the aim of ensuring the inclusive, cooperative, and secure development of the Indian Ocean Region. The doctrine emphasises the importance of collective growth and security, highlighting India’s commitment to fostering collaboration among littoral states and stakeholders within this strategic maritime domain.

The practical implementation of SAGAR is evident in India’s recent actions, including Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) missions such as “Operation Sagar Bandhu[8]” during disasters in 2025. Additionally, India has extended capacity-building assistance to neighbouring countries, reinforcing its role as a trusted partner. These efforts underscore SAGAR’s operational significance in positioning India as a “net security provider” and the region’s first responder. By taking proactive steps, India strengthens mutual trust and contributes to the shaping of a rules-based maritime order in the Indian Ocean Region.

Constraints of Multilateral Organisations

There are inherent limitations to these organisations and systems. Their efficacy is limited by diverse threat perceptions, capability imbalances, and a lack of enforcement capacity. Furthermore, a lot of these procedures are still primarily consultative, helpful for communication, but they are not sufficient to deal with the underlying issues caused by big power contestation in IOR.

7. Is India Prepared in Maritime Domain?

Naval Capabilities

India possesses a capable navy with experience in a wide range of operations and a growing network of partnerships. However, challenges remain in terms of force levels, particularly in the submarine fleet, the pace of modernisation, maritime domain awareness, and institutional coordination. The undersea domain, in particular, remains insufficiently monitored.

Given the increasing number of extra-regional submarine deployments in the Indian Ocean, strengthening anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is equally crucial. To retain undersea superiority, investments in ASW helicopters, long-range marine patrol planes, and underwater sensors are crucial, as is the growth of naval bases and supplies. With enhanced area of maritime interest, investments in indigenous platforms and technologies are inescapable This improvement in capabilities guarantees reliable deterrence and safeguards vital maritime channels, particularly in the vicinity of chokepoints like the Strait of Malacca.

Maritime Domain Awareness

In order to combat grey-zone threats, Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is essential. Through programs like information fusion centres and collaboration with partner nations, India has advanced. However, there are still limitations in underwater awareness and real-time monitoring. Enhancing MDA through the integration of satellite surveillance, information fusion, and coastal radar chains must be India’s top priority. Faster response times and improved coordination with regional partners will be made possible by real-time surveillance of shipping, grey-zone activity, and non-traditional threats.

Coordination of Institutions

Effective maritime strategy needs interagency cooperation between several agencies, including the coast guard, navy, intelligence services, and civilian ministries, through institutional reforms. Institutional silos continue to obstruct a coherent approach despite progress. Sustainable maritime governance and quicker crisis responses can be ensured by implementing a whole-of-government approach and simplifying decision-making.

Strategic Infrastructure Development

Strategic infrastructure is essential for expanding operational reach and maintaining forces, especially in island areas. Although, fair amount of  progress has been made, there are still a lot of gaps in terms of connectivity, surveillance, and logistics. The following paragraphs discuss a few of the initiatives.

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Nicobar & Andaman: The Andaman and Nicobar Islands are strategically significant because of their proximity to the Strait of Malacca, a vital choke point in shipping route. The eastern Indian Ocean is crucial to India’s maritime security in the face of expanding rivalry and increased naval action by other powers because they provide India with a crucial vantage point for monitoring and influencing maritime trade between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. With an emphasis on infrastructure development in the Nicobar group, particularly Great Nicobar Island, India has increased its military and strategic presence through the Andaman & Nicobar Command. A transhipment port at Galathea Bay, more airstrips, better logistics and monitoring, longer runways, the use of marine patrol aircraft, and integrated radar chains are some of the major projects.

Western Indian Ocean: China’s growing presence in Africa through military installations and infrastructure developments, especially in ports on the eastern coast, such as the Mozambique Channel, poses a growing threat to India’s strategic position in the western Indian Ocean. In response, India has started major infrastructure projects, like building a 10,000-foot runway and jetty on Agalega Island near Mauritius, which will support the deployment and maintenance of maritime assets like the P-8I aircraft for surveillance operations.

India’s advantages—geography, capacity, and alliances—can occasionally be overshadowed by a more reactive stance. Determining red lines and efficiently handling grey-zone behaviour without escalating conflict are difficult tests which India must pass.

9. Conclusion.

The Indian Ocean is entering a more complex phase, shaped by ongoing competition, security vulnerabilities, and strategic uncertainty. Grey-zone tactics, fragile chokepoints, and incidents like IRIS Dena show the limits of older security frameworks. Competition continues to expose how vulnerable key passages such as Hormuz really are, and how exposed current maritime systems remain.

For India, the challenge is not just to respond, but to anticipate and influence what happens next. Geography matters, but real influence comes from strategy, capability, and institutional coordination. The future of the Indian Ocean will not be determined by major battles, but by which states can adapt quickly, think ahead, and shape the changing maritime order.

India is the only country in the world which has an ocean named after it. India’s role will depend on how effectively it can adapt and lead. With prominent geographical location in IOR it is suited to influence the region  through proactive strategy and multinational cooperation. The real task for India is to move beyond reacting to events and instead help shape the maritime environment in line with its long-term interests.

Major General (Dr.) S B Asthana,SM,VSM (Veteran)

(The views expressed are personal views of the author, who retains the copy right. The author is a Globally acknowledged Strategic and Security Analyst, He can be reached at Facebook and LinkedIn as Shashi Asthana, @asthana_shashi on twitter, and personnel site https://asthanawrites.org/ email shashiasthana29@gmail.com LinkedIn Profile www.linkedin.com/in/shashi-asthana-4b3801a6.  Youtube link https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCl50YRTBrOCVIxDtHfhvQDQ?view_as=subscriber

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[1] 1.       United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, Part III (Straits Used for International Navigation).

[2] Mirinamniha, Milad (2026), “The Iran War and the Sinking of the IRIS Dena: Assessing the Legality of the U.S. Submarine Attack under International Humanitarian Law”, Human Right Institute, University of Isfahan, [Online: Web] Accessed 01 April 2026, URL: https://www.hriui.com/en/the-iran-war-and-the-sinking-of-the-iris-dena-assessing-the-legality-of-the-u-s-submarine-attack-under-international-humanitarian-law/

[3] United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Article 51 (Self-Defence).

[4] Waitzman, Eren (2025), “UK-Mauritius treaty on the Chagos Archipelago”, House of Lords Library, UK Parliament, 26 June,2025, [Online: Web] Accessed 01 April 2026, URL: https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/uk-mauritius-treaty-on-the-chagos-archipelago/

[5] Butler, Gavin et al (2026), “Why the Strait of Hormuz matters so much in the Iran war”, BBC News, 26 March,2026,  [Online: Web] Accessed 01 April 2026, URL:  https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c78n6p09pzno

[6] Dosson, Raphaël P.P.(2025), “The Malacca Dilemma: China’s Achilles’ Heel”, Modern Diplomacy, 08 July 2025, [Online: Web] Accessed 01 April 2026, URL: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/07/08/the-malacca-dilemma-chinas-achilles-heel/

[7] Khayat,Shanna (2023), “A work in progress: The Indo-Pacific partnership for maritime domain awareness”, Pacific Forum, 23 June,2023, [Online: Web] Accessed 01 April 2026, URL: https://pacforum.org/publications/pacnet-48-a-work-in-progress-the-indo-pacific-partnership-for-maritime-domain-awareness/

[8] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, (2025), “India Undertakes Operation Sagar Bandhu for Emergency HADR Assistance to Sri Lanka following Cyclone Ditwah”, Media Centre, PIB, 01 december,2025.