Sharing an email interview of mine by South China Morning Post on Sino Bhutan Border talks after Bhutanese Foreign Minister Tandi Dorji met Chinese Vice-President Han Zheng in Beijing on 24 October 2023. The interviewer was Shi Jiangtao. Excerpts of this interview also appeared in his article “Why Bhutan’s tilt towards China may ‘significantly change’ regional dynamics” published in South China Morning Post on 29 October 2023. The Interview is placed below.
SCMP
1. What do you make of the reported progress in border talks and the establishment of formal ties between China and Bhutan? (https://english.news.cn/20231023/c2070abd8cec441c8e4df6504dcad463/c.html) Bhutanese Prime Minister Lotay Tshering said earlier this month the border negotiations between China and Bhutan were inching towards completion and the talks involved discussions about a possible land swap between Doklam and northern Bhutan. How likely do you think they will reach a border demarcation agreement soon that may include possible exchange of land over Doklam? To what extent do you think India has been involved in those negotiations?
Major General (Dr) S B Asthana
India and Bhutan share unique and exemplary bilateral relations, which are based on mutual trust, goodwill and understanding. It has been very stable bilateral relationship since the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed in 1949 between the two countries, which was renewed in February 2007. India appreciates that Bhutan is a sovereign country and have never raised any objection to its 24 rounds of its direct boundary talks with China between 1984 and 2016, and the position has not changed for 25th round of talk, which you referred.
The report of a possible land swap between Doklam and northern Bhutan has been published by Chinese media only, but there is no such statement issued by the Bhutanese MFA; hence no statement/comments have been published by Indian MEA, to the best of my knowledge. In such sensitive issues its not uncommon that the two sides attending the meeting issue separate statements presenting the news as per their own interest. The focal point of the joint statement after 25th round of border talk was,
“During the talks, the two leaders of the delegations signed the Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan on the Responsibilities and Functions of the Joint Technical Team (JTT) on the Delimitation and Demarcation of the China-Bhutan Boundary. The JTT was established during the 13th Expert Group Meeting to assist the Expert Group in the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the Three-Step Roadmap”.
I am not very optimistic about the success of delimitation leading to demarcation, in the first ever visit of Bhutanese Foreign Minister to China, looking at the progress of similar statements in context of India (Both countries have been wanting to resolve border issue “soon”) with nothing much moving on ground beyond exchange of maps of some areas. Bhutan understand the sensitivities of India pertaining to the area of trijunction between China, Bhutan and India in Chumbi Valley and its proximity to Siliguri Corridor. Bhutan’s Prime Minister Dr. Tshering and Foreign Minister Dr. Dorji have said in interviews earlier this year that no agreement would be made “against India’s interests”, and clarified that any talks about the “trijunction” at Doklam would only be held trilaterally between India, Bhutan and China. It is also in consonance with Indian firm position that the two Governments had in 2012 reached agreement that the tri-junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalized in consultation with the concerned countries. Any attempt, therefore, to unilaterally determine tri-junction points is in violation of this understanding. India too has been issuing statements in the past that it “very closely follows” the talks as it pertains to its security, especially near the trijunction point near Doklam.
SCMP
2. Will such a border deal pave the way for the establishment of bilateral ties between China and Bhutan? How soon do you think it will happen? I also wonder if Bhutan can cut a border deal and set up formal ties with China without India’s blessing, considering Bhutan’s special ties with New Delhi and its status as a protected state. Will it also change Bhutan’s policy against diplomatic ties with UNSC permanent members? How should be make sense of the negotiations on disputed borders and forming diplomatic ties with Beijing from Bhutan’s perspective? (Bhutanese Foreign Minister’s Beijing visit came just days after a Pentagon report on Chinese military power this month which said China has continued to develop infrastructure along the Line of Actual Control with India and new villages in disputed area in neighbouring Bhutan.)
Major General (Dr) S B Asthana
As regards border deal, I have already answered it while answering Question 1. To add I must say that there is significant linkage with India in trying to resolve Doklam issue by Bhutan with China, which is evident from the statement of the Prime Minister Dasho Dr Lotay Tshering, which has been interpreted differently by different stakeholders to suit their narrative. He states,
‘Doklam is a junction point between India, China and Bhutan. It is not up to Bhutan alone to solve the problem. We are three. There is no big or small country, there are three equal countries, each counting for a third. We are ready. As soon as the other two parties are also ready, we can discuss. India and China have problems all along their border. We are therefore waiting to see how they will resolve their differences.”
It is evident from these statements that resolution of border problem between China and India is linked and Bhutanese leadership is sensitive to the fact and has stated that they will not like to solve a problem in a manner that it gives rise to further problems. As of now the fine print of the potential deal you have mentioned is not in public domain and I will comment on its implications only after going over the details.
As regards bilateral diplomatic ties with China, my understanding is that earlier monarchy was not keen to have diplomatic with any one of the P5 members of UNSC due to the premise that having diplomatic ties with one of them might necessitate having ties with all of them, which the small Himalayan kingdom was expecting to be difficult to manage. After the elected government has come to power, there may be change in aspirations and policies and Bhutan may opt for direct diplomatic relations with more countries. However, it will have consider the fact that so far, Bhutan has been enjoying neutral and non-aligned status so far, with respect to big powers or P5, but opening bilateral ties with China will show them in Chinese camp, with no major benefits, unless it decides to host all five embassies and be part of ‘Big Power contestation. It being a sovereign nation, will make appropriate decision in its national interest. Notwithstanding what Chinese media has put out now, earlier, When asked about Bhutan’s position on opening diplomatic ties with China, Dr. Tshering had been non-committal, saying, “Theoretically, how can Bhutan not have any bilateral relations with China? The question is when, and in what manner.”
SCMP
3. What are the possible implications on India, the Sino-Indian ties and the regional geopolitical landscape? Is it fair to say Beijing’s efforts to pull Bhutan closer is at least partly aimed at New Delhi? What do the latest developments in China’s ties with Bhutan and other South Asian countries inform us about Beijing’s strategy vis-à-vis New Delhi and possibly Washington?
Major General (Dr) S B Asthana
If you analyse the terrain and geographical location of Bhutan, you will realise that its lines of communications need to pass through India. It is sandwiched between China and India and its terrain is very rugged on its northern borders with China. Accordingly, historically, its dependence on India has been more than any other country. It has limited CNP and does not pose any threat to China or India. It has limited resources and is not an economically attractive destination for China. Chinese outreach to Bhutan, therefore, has strategic intention of somehow convincing or luring Bhutan to get Doklam Pleateau, extend its claim by shifting claim lines towards Eastern Bhutan to improve defence potential of the Chumbi Valley, reduce its vulnerability, and extend its reach towards Siliguri Corridor to increase Indian concerns. To that extent it may not be wrong to deduce that Beijing’s efforts to pull Bhutan closer could partly be aimed at New Delhi.
China follows strategy of incremental encroachment along its neighbours including South Asian Countries in its periphery by encroaching through infrastructure development, building villages, infrastructure diplomacy and purse diplomacy. Some of the countries had bad experience of debt trap. It is looking at China centric Asia and is trying to convey it in more than one measure to India as well as America, without stating it anywhere.
Excerpts of this interview also appeared in his article “Why Bhutan’s tilt towards China may ‘significantly change’ regional dynamics” published in South China Morning Post on 29 October 2023. The URL of the same is attached below.
Asthana Writes 