Sharing an interview of mine by Foreign Policy Research Centre (FPRC) focussing on South China Sea: Global Stakeholders. The interviewer is Prof. Mahendra Gaur, Director, FPRC.
FPRC
Do you agree that the SCS problem is all about China’s sweeping claims of sovereignty over the sea? Is it also about claims over the skies above it?
Major General (Dr) S B Asthana
South China Sea (SCS) problem, in my opinion, is that of overlapping EEZ of China and other South East Asian Countries, which has been aggressively pushed by China to its advantage, citing one sided interpretation of its history to justify its illegal occupation of some of the features in SCS, junking all international claims and decisions on the subject.
China on the pretext of sovereignty claims based on its own interpretation of historical maritime boundaries has carried out incremental encroachment into South China Sea, as part of its ‘Active Defence Policy’, which is the same strategy applied to for encroachment in Doklam/Ladakh. The Chinese Foreign Minister had said “The islands in the South China Sea (SCS) have been China’s territory since ancient times, and China has the right to safeguard its territorial sovereignty”. It indirectly means that the world must accept whatever China claims as having been part of Qing dynasty or any other historical period as per its convenience, as sovereign territory of China. That is an unacceptable logic, because by same logic Bangladesh, Pakistan and Myanmar should be part of India, which will be considered absurd in the modern world.
The SCS is a busy international waterway, one of the main arteries of global trade worth more than $5 trillion and is growing year on year. It is a rich source of hydrocarbons and natural resources. All users of SCS has stakes in SCS face-off to prevent Chinese interference in ‘Free and open Indo-Pacific’ on account of major chunk of global shipping trade passing through it, freedom of flight, restriction in offshore drilling deals for oil, control of fishing and other resources, and use of other global commons in international waters.
The construction of airstrips, deployment of missiles, radars and other logistics facilities by China are an attempt to convert ‘Atolls’ in SCS into ‘Island’. This will help in converting the SCS into “China’s Lake” by using provisions of same UNCLOS, which it has been ignoring elsewhere. China’s blatant refusal to Accept International Court of Arbitration Verdict on the case taken up by Philippines, and continued build-up of infrastructure on atolls to convert them into islands have continued. The ICA decision however conveyed the global message to China that SCS cannot be treated as Chinese lake, as its legally untenable and global SLOC and trade is affected by it. It also gave a message that similar adventurism to claim any global choke-point anywhere in the world, will also invite sharp criticism.
In context of claim over the skies above it, China has not obstructed any trade shipping or flight over SCS, so far, but in future if SCS is allowed to become China’s lake, it may lay down some rules of business inconvenient to other users of SCS and global commons. In case it declares SCS as its Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in future, the freedom of flights over international waters of SCS will get affected adversely.
FPRC
The disputed waters have emerged as a delicate front in the rivalry between China and the US. Why are other western nations and the EU opposed to China’s claims on SCS?
Major General (Dr) S B Asthana
South China Sea (SCS) is a region of tremendous economic and strategic importance. One-third of the world’s maritime shipping passes through it, carrying over US$5 trillion in trade each year. Huge oil and natural gas reserves are believed to lie beneath its seabed. It is estimated that Indo-Pacific Region will soon be ‘Economic Centre of Gravity’ of the world with many emerging economies are in this region. SCS is lifeline to most of such emerging economies. Western countries are aware that they can’t help trading with these countries including China, Japan, ASEAN countries and India. A free and open Indo-Pacific (including SCS) thus becomes an economic and strategic necessity for entire world including western countries and EU. It makes SCS problem a global issue and a flash point of ‘Big Power Contestation’ with involvement of US along with other users including Western nations and EU members.
China’s strategic competition with US in Asia is a reality, and it is increasingly encroaching into US strategic space and influence, which includes SCS. Military posturing, tough statements and other actions of US, have not helped them much in losing ground to China, as it has not halted its activities. While the infrastructure development by China in SCS is dual use facility (civil as well as military), it is viewed as usurping global commons by US and other users of SCS, and strategic encroachment by regional claimants. The strategic and military posturing and occasional hard statements on the claim of ‘Freedom of Navigation’ by US is considered as ‘Disturbance to regional peace’ by China. With China’s claim that US is destabilizing/militarizing SCS, it may appear to be as China-US issue, but rest of the world including EU and India, whose trade is passing through this crucial global SLOC may also not like to see SCS being converted into China’s lake. While China will like to claim its freedom of navigation elsewhere, but it’s attempt to make SCS a sovereignty issue may not let it remain a zone of peace.
SCS has one-third of the entire world’s marine biodiversity and contains lucrative fisheries providing food security to the Southeast Asian nations. If more than 50 percent of global maritime trade volume passes through SCS, it is definitely a global concern; hence its strategic dimensions and implications are well beyond the regional domain. All global users of SCS are concerned about Chinese declarations which invoke not only the right to inspect cargo, but also the ability to restrict traffic; hence will like to work together to ensure ‘Free and open Indo-Pacific and SCS’.
FPRC
How do you look at ASEAN’s approach to SCS?
Major General (Dr) S B Asthana
SCS dispute divides ASEAN countries into three categories. The first category is those, who have direct conflicting/overlapping claims over various islands, shoals, reefs and other features with China. They are looking for outside support without annoying China beyond a point, but retaining their claim. The second category is of those, who have moral and material support of US, and are seen clearly in US strategic orbit, seeking their help to control the aggressive moves of China i.e. stop reclamation activities. Similarly few countries are clearly siding China for their own national interests. The third category is those who are in the region, affected by the power-play, but are fence sitters, trying to extract the best from China and US. They will not like to be seen taking sides for any strong move by either side. They would continue to quote Declaration of Conduct (DoC), and Code of Conduct(CoC), whenever their stance is asked for.
The Chinese assertiveness and ‘Incremental Encroachment’ in the region followed by physical action of construction of twin use infrastructure on disputed shoals has demonstrated China’s resolve to assert its claim, as China perceives it. Recent satellite pictures of a new airstrip stretching across Triton Island in the Paracel indicates that China will continue its encroachment efforts, unless stopped. The Chinese effort seems to be to give a regional colour to the dispute, and impress upon smaller neighbours in South Eastern Countries to deal with her on bilateral terms, use ‘Purse Diplomacy’, ‘Infrastructure Diplomacy’, luring them with investments, and limited coercion to make them speak the narrative of regional bilateral issue and non-interference of ‘Outside Powers’. I do not think that the stance on the ‘conflicting claim’ of any smaller neighbour/ASEAN country has been affected, although most of them may not have opposed China aggressively. No smaller neighbour amongst South Eastern Countries has given up its claims or criticised Philippines for having gone in for international arbitration. The recent incident of Chinese boats obstructing Philippine’s boat on its way to resupply troops stationed at the Second Thomas Shoal, a reef controlled by Manila indicates continued Chinese coercion in SCS. The concern shown by other users of SCS is also going to embolden them to maintain their stance, after all the EEZ principle applies equally to these smaller claimant countries as well, and they must be expecting a just and legitimate space in SCS.
In strategic power play the US also tried to get ASEAN on board through various US- ASEAN summits in past, however it could not get a joint statement to prevent China’s aggressive action on construction of infrastructure on disputed islands/shoals or reefs, or against any aggressive behaviour of China. However its ‘Pivot of Asia’ strategy, increasing density of combat ships in Pacific Ocean, strategic partnerships, IPEF and other measures are proving effective. The strategic and military posturing in SCS, arms transfer to some of Chinese neighbours, together with series of Freedom of Navigation exercises with Chinese neighbours, have definitely caused a shift amongst some of the South Eastern Countries in hardening their stance towards their claims e.g. Philippines fighting it out in International Court of Justice in past and recently conceding to additional military bases to USA, is a case in point. However most of the countries are in need of economic help of China and not in a position to confront them directly, but they will keep their claims alive, with hardened stance. They would therefore look forward for greater US presence, which does instil some more confidence in them, and greater opposition from other users of SCS. The countries in ASEAN, who do not have conflicting claim with China in SCS will continue to try getting the best of both China, as well as US.
FPRC
What are Japanese and Australian perspectives on SCS?
Major General (Dr) S B Asthana
Japan may not be direct claimant of South China Sea, but its critical SLOC and supply chain passes through it. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, 85%–90% of Japan’s oil imports (roughly 75% of China’s oil imports), and 33% of Japan’s LNG imports pass through the sea lanes of communication (SLOC) of the SCS. (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2013: 3; Herberg 2016). Japanese war ships are passing regularly through the SCS, stopping often in Singapore, on their way to and from the anti-piracy operations on the east coast.
As China is aggressively pursuing its claims to most of the SCS through political, economic, and military means, Japan has become more involved as one of the top world trading nations with considerable political, economic and strategic interests in Southeast Asia, as a security alliance partner of the US, and as a country which has territorial as well as Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) border disputes with China in the East China Sea (ECS). If China succeeds in converting SCS as Chinese lake, East China Sea (ECS) could be next. China’s SCS policies therefore fit into Japan’s narrative of the “China Threat”, whereas Japan’s SCS policies fit into China’s narrative of Japan as a troublemaker at the side of the US. Like other users of SCS Japan therefore is a major stake holder in ensuring ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’. Being an active member and architect of Quad, and Security arrangements with US, it is taking active part in Malabar Exercises for effective posturing in the region.
Historically, In late 2007 China overtook Japan to become Australia’s largest trading partner, and in 2009 became Australia’s largest export market. Australia is China’s seventh largest trading partner. The two-way trade is more than $100 billion. The economic engagement led to many successive Australian regimes accommodating their relationship with China. Chinese aggressiveness in SCS and punitive actions in response to Australia asking for probe in coronavirus origin, led to different approach wherein the security interests became important in dealing with China. Like other users Australia too is a major user of SCS in transhipment of goods and wants to secure its legitimate security interests threatened by China in Indo-Pacific region.
Australia is part of Quad and AUKUS, which China feels is a threat to its interests in SCS and Indo-Pacific. Australia’s policy therefore against China in Indo-Pacific region is of dissuasion. It started participating in Malabar exercises and is also looking at military capacity building by signing for induction of nuclear powered submarines and other military hardware to contribute towards free and open Indo-Pacific and rule based order. It could intensify ‘mini-lateral’ cooperation with other non-claimant states such as India, Japan, Singapore and Indonesia, all of whom share misgivings about China’s ambitions and actions. Recently Australia is seen to be working more closely with the Philippines on joint patrols in the disputed waters and participating in joint maritime exercise with Philippines and USA.
FPRC
Should India be worried about the developments in SCS?
Major General (Dr) S B Asthana
With over 55 percent of India’s trade passing through the South China Sea, its involvement in maritime security there is extremely important than ever. Additionally, there are other maritime assets such as two oil exploration blocks, 127 and 128, off the coast of Vietnam that the two countries are jointly exploring, which are getting hampered by Chinese coercive developments in SCS. India holds a principled position on the use of global commons such as maritime resources that it should be free, open and “inclusive”. It also commits to a maritime order/rule of law that is fair.
Strategically, “Chinese Incremental Encroachment Strategy” in SCS is equally applicable in Sino-Indian borders in Himalayas. If China succeeds in SCS it will get emboldened to repeat the same in Himalayas too, which is a challenge to India. If China has created a two front threat to India in collusion with Pakistan, it is incumbent on India to pose multifront situation for China too. India can’t do it alone; hence strategic partnerships with affected countries, being part of Quad and conducting Malabar exercises makes sense towards that end. India’s participation in the inaugural ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise (AIME 2023) in 2023, in the South China Sea waters indicates its willingness to step in military resources in SCS and the logic of insisting on the centrality of ASEAN in Quad Plus.
Considering the prevailing international strategic scenario, China is reasonably confident that the US or any other country will not use military force against it. Beijing is increasing its naval capability to become the largest Navy. In this context, it is necessary that Quad strengthens itself beyond Malabar exercises. Quad members must continue freedom of navigation exercises and military posturing in Indo-Pacific as China continues to do so. The global community must continue to condemn Chinese encroachment. Quad, in its present form (Not being a military grouping as yet), may not be effective enough to check Chinese adventurism, but it certainly has potential to become one of the effective instruments to do so, provided the affected countries and the global community unite against their common concerns. Through Malabar exercises, adequate interoperability between the Navies of its members has been achieved. With interoperability in place, if the correct military posturing exists and if adequate military assets are in place, the intentions can change at short notice, if Chinese aggressiveness becomes unbearable to Quad plus members.
Major General (Dr) S B Asthana
(The views expressed are personal views of the author, who retains the copy right). The author can be reached at Facebook and LinkedIn as Shashi Asthana, @asthana_shashi on twitter, and personnel site https://asthanawrites.org/ email shashiasthana29@gmail.com LinkedIn Profile www.linkedin.com/in/shashi-asthana-4b3801a6
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- MAJOR GENERAL (Dr.) S B ASTHANA, SM, VSM, Ph.D. (VETERAN)
Globally acknowledged Strategic and Security Analyst, Ph.D. from JNU, has authored over 450 publications. Veteran Infantry General with 45 years of experience at national and varied international fields. Former Director General Infantry in Indian Army. Held various key appointments in Army and United Nations.
Director Courses, USI of India, the oldest think tank of India. TV commentator, Speaker in various Strategic, Military forums, UN Organisations, Think tanks and Universities. Interviewed by various National and International news channels/newspapers/organisations on strategic, military and UN related subjects.
Currently On Governing/Security Council Confederation of Education Excellence CEE, International
Organisation of Education Development (IOED), and other UN Organisations. On Advisory Board of Global Advisors Consultants Corporation, IOED representative in UN Headquarters, Vienna, Austria. Distinguished Expert, Bharat Centre of Canada. Advisor Amity University, Bharat Media LLC, USA, former member Expert Group Challenges Forum, Sweden.
Awarded twice by President of India, twice by UN, CEE excellence award for Nation building by Governor of Haryana. Awarded for “International Diplomacy and Global Conflict Resolutions” by IOED twice, a Consultative body for ECOSOC and International Police Commission – IPC India, by former Prime Minister of Moldova.
Foreign Policy Research Centre
Asthana Writes 
In-depth analysis. Thank you, sir.
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