Sharing a chapter of mine published in a book jointly published by United Service Institution of India, New Delhi (Oldest Think Tank in India) and Army War College, Mhow, India, titled “Modern Conflicts and Changing Character of Warfare: Implications for India, published by Pentagon Press LLP, New Delhi, ISBN 978-81-993527-8-0, 2025. My article is titled “Evolution of Operational Art and Strategy: Application in Modern Conflicts” . For the ease of readers I am reproducing the my Chapter below.
Evolution of Operational Art and Strategy: Application in Modern Conflicts
Major General (Dr) S B Asthana,SM,VSM,PhD (Veteran)
“In contemporary conflicts, where tactical actions can carry strategic weight and perception often rivals firepower, operational art must embrace both the cognitive and physical dimensions”
Abstract
This article traces the evolution of operational art and strategy from classical foundations to their contemporary manifestations in modern conflicts. Beginning with Kautilya and Sun Tzu’s insights on psychological dislocation and deception, it examines how Clausewitz, Jomini, and Soviet theorists shaped the intellectual and doctrinal framework of operational art. The study highlights the impact of industrialization, World Wars, and the Cold War in transforming strategic thought, leading to concepts such as Blitzkrieg, Deep Operations, deterrence, and proxy wars. It further explores post–Cold War revolutions in military affairs, hybrid and multi-domain warfare, cyber and space operations, and the role of artificial intelligence. Through case studies of the Russia–Ukraine war, Israel–Hamas conflict, and India’s campaigns, the article underscores the challenges of integrating military and non-military instruments, narrative warfare, and conflict termination. It concludes that future operational art must balance classical principles with innovation to ensure strategic advantage in a volatile multipolar world.
Introduction
Operational art and strategy form the connective tissue between military tactics and political objectives. Their evolution reflects centuries of doctrinal refinement, from Kautilya’s Arthashastra and Sun Tzu’s Art of War to modern doctrines of hybrid, cyber, and multi-domain warfare. In today’s dynamic security environment, characterized by durable disorder, hybrid threats, and blurred boundaries between peace and war, operational art has become more relevant than ever.
Warfare has continuously evolved in scope, intensity, and character with technological advancements, political shifts, and doctrinal innovation. The industrial revolution revolutionized combat with enhanced firepower, mobility, and communication, leading to the emergence of operational art as a distinct level of war between tactics and strategy. In the 20th and 21st centuries, besides technological advances, new domains such as cyber and space, and the rise of hybrid threats have further expanded its complexity. Operational art now represents the vital link between tactical actions and strategic outcomes, providing the framework for translating military power into decisive political results.
The concepts of operational art and strategy, once confined to linear battles and state-centric wars, have expanded in scope to encompass hybrid warfare, cyber operations, and information dominance. While Clausewitz’s dictum of war as a continuation of politics remains valid, the methods of conducting war have undergone radical transformation. This article examines the evolution of operational art and strategy from their classical roots to their contemporary manifestations, emphasizing the dynamics of modern conflicts.
Historical Foundations of Operational Thought
Kautilya and Sun Tzu
Kautilya[i] had emphasized psychological dislocation and collapse of the adversary through strategic design rather than brute force, foreshadowing modern ideas of perception management and cognitive warfare, which can be claimed as historic beginning of operational thoughts.
Similarly, Sun Tzu[ii] famously asserted that the highest excellence lies in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting, highlighting deception, morale, and anticipation as decisive factors.Classical Foundations of Strategy
The western literature indicates that the intellectual foundation of operational art and strategy was laid by Antoine-Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz. Jomini[iii] advocated systematic principles of manoeuvre, interior lines, and decisive points. Clausewitz[iv] conceptualized the ‘fog and friction’ of war and emphasised it to be viewed as an extension of politics by other means. Their contrasting perspectives shaped the intellectual bedrock of operational art. Their insights continue to influence doctrines worldwide.
Evolution through Industrial Age and Major Wars
Initial Contours of Operational Art
The late 19th and early 20th centuries witnessed the industrialization of warfare. The First World War revealed the limitations of attritionist approaches, where immense destruction produced stalemate. The strategic stalemate despite tactical innovations, created the demand for a new level of military thinking—operational art. Soviet theorists such as Alexander Svechin and Mikhail Tukhachevsky formalized the concept of the ‘operational level of war,’ bridging tactics and strategy, articulated Deep Battle[v], which connected tactical actions to strategic effects across depth and time. This became the essence of operational art.
Napoleonic Wars
The Napoleonic era marked the beginning of operational maneuver warfare, as large armies maneuvered over vast spaces, integrating logistics and strategy in unprecedented ways. Napoleon’s ability to align operational maneuver with political goals added to the foundation of modern operational art.
World War II: Blitzkrieg and Deep Operations
In World War II, the Germans introduced Blitzkrieg, integrating tanks, air power, and mechanized infantry to achieve rapid breakthroughs. They epitomized speed, mass, and deception, exploiting vulnerabilities to shatter cohesion. Conversely, the Soviets developed Deep Operations, emphasizing depth, overwhelming the enemy by echeloned and sustained offensive operations. The U.S. conceptualized AirLand Battle, while India’s 1971 Eastern campaign reflected the decisive application of maneuver warfare. All these approaches exemplified the maturation of operational art.
Contemporary Theories of War
Defining Operational Art Post World Wars
By the end of world wars the definition of Operational art being the skillful linkage of means, ways, and ends was well conceived. It involves identifying the adversary’s center of gravity, orchestrating firepower and maneuver, and structuring campaigns through decisive points, sequencing, and shaping the battlefield. It emphasizes not only physical outcomes but also psychological effects—seeking to unhinge the enemy’s decision-making and will to resist.
Attritionist Approach
Attrition seeks to degrade adversary capacity through superior firepower and sustained destruction and endurance. While effective in certain conditions (e.g., Kargil 1999), it is costly in lives and resources. Its relevance diminishes in an era of battlefield transparency, precision munitions, and drones—evident in Russia’s struggles in Ukraine.
Manoeuvrist Approach
Maneuver warfare is focused on speed, shock, and dislocation to collapse cohesion and will, rather than simply destroying forces. seeks to collapse enemy cohesion psychologically and physically through rapid, unexpected actions. The Inchon landings and India’s 1971 Eastern campaign illustrate its success. Modern doctrine blends attrition with maneuver.
Modern conflicts increasingly combine attrition (e.g., long-range fires, drone warfare) with maneuver (mobility, tempo, psychological shock), making hybrid applications the norm.
Transformations in Operational Art During Cold War and Beyond
Strategy under Nuclear Shadow
The advent of nuclear weapons[vi] redefined strategic thought. Theories of deterrence, dissuasion and mutually assured destruction (MAD) dominated strategic discourse, prevented great-power kinetic conflict. Conventional operational art, however, adapted to limited wars and proxy conflicts.
Guerrilla and Revolutionary Warfare
The Cold War also saw the proliferation of asymmetric strategies, such as Mao Zedong’s ‘People’s War,’ and the Viet Cong’s guerrilla campaigns. These conflicts demonstrated that political will and protracted insurgency could offset superior conventional operational art.
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)
The 1991 Gulf War epitomized the RMA, marked by precision-guided munitions, stealth technology, and real-time command and control. The U.S. demonstrated how technology-driven operational art could achieve ‘shock and awe’.
Operations Other Than War
Humanitarian interventions, peacekeeping, and counterterrorism in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo illustrated the broadening of strategy beyond traditional battlefields. Operational art now included political sensitivities, media management, and coalition dynamics.
21st Century Conflicts: Hybrid and Multi-Domain Warfare
The Global War on Terror
Post-9/11 conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq showcased the challenges of applying traditional operational art to counterinsurgency[vii] (COIN). The U.S. Army’s FM 3-24 doctrine emphasized population-centric approaches, but strategic fatigue highlighted the limits of prolonged interventions.
Hybrid Warfare
Conflicts in Georgia (2008), Ukraine (2014–present), and Syria revealed the rise of hybrid[viii] warfare, blending conventional forces, irregulars, cyber operations, and disinformation campaigns. Russia’s ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ emphasized the fusion of kinetic and non-kinetic tools. Russia’s Crimea campaign, China’s ‘Incremental Encroachment Strategy”[ix] in the South China Sea, and Pakistan’s proxy strategies against India exemplify this model.
Fourth-Generation and Unrestricted Warfare
The lone wolf insurgent/terror operations by terrorist groups/non state actors have added on to Fourth Generation Warfare. The ‘war amongst the people’ concept shows how tactical events can have strategic impact. Modern conflicts emphasize indirect instruments—economic coercion, lawfare, media manipulation, and information dominance. Chinese ‘Three Warfare Strategy’ namely media, psychological and legal warfare and ‘Strategy of Three Evils’[x] namely terrorism, separatism and religious extremism are significant to note. Chinese indicated no bounds and no rules in their ‘Unrestricted Warfare’.
Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)
Modern operational art now integrates land, air, sea, cyber, and space domains. The U.S., NATO, and China have developed doctrines for MDO[xi], where victory is achieved by dominance across interconnected domains.
Technology as a Force Multiplier
Cyber Warfare: Cyber operations have emerged as a critical strategic tool. Stuxnet[xii] (2010) demonstrated how cyber weapons could achieve strategic objectives without kinetic conflict. Nations now view cyberspace as a decisive operational domain.
Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy: The integration of AI, drones, and autonomous systems is reshaping operational planning. Precision targeting, predictive analytics, and unmanned swarms enhance both offensive and defensive strategies.
Space as a Strategic Frontier. With the establishment of the U.S. Space Force and China’s anti-satellite capabilities, space warfare has become integral to modern operational art, influencing communications, navigation, and intelligence.
Current Strategic Theories
Network-Centric Warfare
Developed in the 1990s, network-centric warfare[xiii] emphasizes information superiority and interconnected forces. By compressing decision cycles, it enhances operational tempo.
Gray-Zone Operations
China’s strategy in the South China Sea and Russia’s actions in Crimea reflect gray-zone tactics, where incremental gains are pursued below the threshold of conventional war, challenging traditional notions of strategy.
Resurgence of Proxy Wars/Shadow Wars
From Yemen to Ukraine, proxy conflicts highlight how states employ local actors, private military companies, mercenaries, legions and militias to achieve strategic depth without direct confrontation.
Operational Art in Modern Context
Components of Operational Art
Operational art involves synchronizing military and non-military instruments to achieve strategic objectives with minimal cost and within time constraints. Key components in modern times include operational factors (time, space, force), functions (command, intelligence, logistics, fires, protection), and principles (Center of Gravity, culmination points, sequencing).
Operational Objectives and Core Elements
Clausewitz emphasized three paths to defeat an adversary: destroying forces, occupying territory, or breaking will. Accordingly, operational objectives can firstly be Force oriented involving destruction of reserves, tying down critical forces, Secondly Terrain related like seizing vital ground or communication hubs or Infrastructure-focused crippling logistics, networks, or digital systems and thirdly Psychological – inducing paralysis in enemy leadership and morale. Supporting elements include fire and maneuver, intelligence, deception, reserves, and logistics, all synchronized to shape tempo and exploit opportunities.
Proliferation of Low-Intensity Conflicts
Since 1945, most conflicts have been low-intensity, often involving great-power participation directly or indirectly. Counterinsurgency, proxy wars, and hybrid threats dominated global scene till few recent wars.
Expansion of War Domains
From land, sea, and air, modern conflict now encompasses space, cyber, and the cognitive domain. C4ISR networks, drones, and precision targeting redefine operational possibilities.
Durable Disorder[xiv] and Strategic Competition
Institutions are weakening, and non-state actors are weaponized by states. Economic, political, technological, and informational wars now coexist with kinetic operations.
The Cognitive and Information Dimension
Media and Narrative Warfare: Modern conflicts are fought under global media glare. Narratives around Galwan, Gaza, or Ukraine shape legitimacy and will. Operational art integrates strategic communication with kinetic action.
Influence Operations and Perception Management: China’s Three Warfares, Russia’s disinformation, and Pakistan’s narrative-building highlight how perception warfare can be decisive.
Conflict Termination: Strategy Beyond the Battlefield
Conflict Termination and Exit Strategies: As Liddell Hart[xv] warned, the objective of war must be a better peace. Operational art must therefore envision conflict termination—defining achievable political aims, sequencing campaigns to avoid exhaustion, and integrating diplomatic and informational instruments to secure favorable outcomes. The U.S. withdrawals from Vietnam and Afghanistan underline the risks of neglecting this phase.
Principles of Conflict Termination: Conflict termination is about shaping a favorable peace, not merely winning battles. Liddell Hart stressed that without envisioning the post-war order, victory may become pyrrhic.
Ingredients of Victory: Achievable political objectives, defined end-state, degradation of adversary potential, population disillusionment, and avoidance of prohibitive casualties are essential.
Exit Policies: As seen in U.S. withdrawals from Vietnam and Afghanistan, exit strategies must be integral to operational art. Stabilization, reconciliation, or status quo acceptance often replace outright victory.
Application of Operational Art in few Modern Conflicts
Russia-Ukraine War (2022 Onwards)
The conflict illustrates both the failures and adaptations of operational art. Russia’s initial offensive exhibited a turning move[xvi] to turn the defences of Donbass region but it got stalled due to logistical shortcomings, and miscalculating the potential of Ukrainian resistance in fighting from built up areas, aided by modern western technology, ISR and top attack projectiles.
However, in subsequent attrition warfare, after adopting a viable defence line, drone usage, missile campaigns underlining the fusion of old and new operational approaches, Russians could turn the tide in their favour capturing over 20 percent of Ukrainian territory and keeping the momentum & tempo of operations till now. Of late, while Russians have a clarity in aim and strategy, the western adversaries are struggling with unclear aim, strategy with no idea of end state and exit strategy.
Israel–Hamas Conflict
The Israel-Hamas-Iran war, sparked by Hamas’s 2023 dastardly terror attack and escalating to 2025, reveals critical flaws in the parties’ operational art and strategy. Israel’s intelligence-driven, precision, multi-front strikes dismantled Hamas and Hezbollah’s infrastructure but lacked a viable end state and post-conflict governance plan, risking Hamas’s resurgence amid Gaza’s humanitarian devastation, global criticism and isolation. This “mowing the grass” approach, reliant on airpower and AI targeting with impractical political endgame of ‘Greater Israel’[xvii], exposed a bias for short-term action over sustainable deterrence, exacerbating civilian casualties in dense urban terrain and inviting accusations of disproportionality and genocide.
Hamas’s guerrilla tactics, using hostages as human shields, embedding in civilian areas, and leveraging tunnels for surprise incursions, ensured limited tactical resilience but invited crushing Israeli retaliation, sacrificing lives without advancing Palestinian statehood, barely ensuring its ideological survival at immense human cost. Iran’s proxy-centric “Axis of Resistance” strategy, arming groups to encircle Israel, faltered as depleted proxies like the Houthis and Iraqi militias offered negligible support during direct 2025 clashes, failed to counter Israeli pre-emption, highlighting Tehran’s loss of control and exposure of its nuclear ambitions to devastating strikes, ultimately eroding its regional deterrence without achieving existential goals against Israel.
Overall, these misapplications of operational art—prioritizing ideological vendettas over pragmatic exits—have transformed a localized conflict into a quagmire of mutual exhaustion.
Indian Experience in Application of Operational Art
The 1971 India–Pakistan War
India’s Eastern campaign remains a classic case of operational brilliance. Superior synergy among political, military, and diplomatic instruments; focus on Dhaka as the center of gravity; and synchronized Army–Navy–Air Force operations ensured rapid victory within 13 days. Strategic offensive on Eastern Front and strategic defence on Western Front ensured strategic balance generating adequate combat ratios.
Kargil War 1999
By contrast, Operation Vijay was attrition-oriented, relying on heavy artillery and high force ratios to dislodge entrenched Pakistani troops. The campaign succeeded but at great cost, highlighting limitations of attrition warfare, when maneuver is restricted by terrain and other geopolitical reasons.
Operation Sindoor
Operation Sindoor[xviii] marked a watershed in India’s strategic doctrine, launched after the Pakistan-sponsored Pahalgam terror attack of April 2025. It showcased India’s shift from restraint to calibrated offensive action to integrated military precision strikes using all instruments of national power to include diplomatic, economic, military, technological and informational tools. By degrading terror infrastructure, suspending the Indus Water Treaty, and leveraging indigenous technologies like Akashteer and SCALP, India demonstrated comprehensive national power and Atmanirbhar capability. By carefully applying principles of operational art—clear end-state, centre of gravity identification, surprise, deception, escalation control and exit strategy—India executed multi-domain precision strikes while avoiding a full-scale war. The operation exposed gaps in information warfare, reaffirmed the role of drones, tri-service integration, while establishing a new deterrence doctrine: terrorism will be treated as an act of war
Operational Art in India’s Current Context
India’s strategic environment—with collusive threats from nuclear-armed China and Pakistan—demands refined operational art. Key dimensions include:
Conflict Management & Deterrence: Proactive concepts for limited war, preventive deployments against China’s salami-slicing, and credible nuclear deterrence posture.
Force Projection & Regional Influence: Protecting Indian Ocean Sea lanes, regional peacekeeping, and power projection by the Navy.
Counter-Terrorism & Insurgency: Intelligence-driven, flexible operations (e.g., Op Rakshak in Kashmir) highlight operational art beyond conventional war.
Technology and Modernization: Integration of drones, cyber, space assets, and AI-enabled systems into operational design.
Non-Kinetic and Influence Operations: Cyber warfare, psychological ops, and media narratives increasingly shape outcomes.
Humanitarian and Disaster Relief: Rapid deployments during the 2004 Tsunami and 2015 Nepal earthquake and many disasters subsequently showcase operational art in non-combat contexts.
Contemporary Challenges in Operational Art
Compressed Time and Space: Urbanization and advanced surveillance have reduced operational depth and possibility of achieving surprise.
Multi-Domain Environment: Future campaigns require simultaneous dominance across land, air, sea, cyber, and space. Need for simultaneity and non-linearity of operations
Durable Disorder: Non-state actors, proxy wars, and hybrid threats complicate operational design.
Information and Narrative Warfare: Media and perception often shape legitimacy as much as battlefield outcomes.
Technology Dependence: Reliance on AI and networks makes modern militaries vulnerable to cyber disruption.
Ethical and Legal Dimensions: Autonomous weapons and hybrid operations raise challenges under international law. Unacceptable civilian casualties and collateral damages in Gaza leading to condemnation of Israel is a case in point.
Civil-Military Integration: Modern strategy requires whole-of-nation approaches, incorporating diplomacy, economics, and information.
Escalation Risks: Multi-domain warfare increases the chances of inadvertent escalation, especially with nuclear powers.
The Future of Operational Art and Strategy
Operational art will continue to evolve under the pressures of great-power competition and technological innovation. The challenge for strategists lies in balancing traditional military power with adaptive, innovative approaches that integrate new technologies while addressing political realities. Future conflicts are likely to feature some of the underlined characters. Multi-Domain Operations (MDO). Future operations will demand simultaneous dominance across land, sea, air, cyber, and space. The U.S. MDO 2028 concept envisions integrated deterrence and synchronized campaigns, combining nuclear, conventional, cyber, and space assets.
Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy
AI-enabled decision-making with reduced human intervention, autonomous drones, and predictive analytics will transform tempo and scale. The ethical implications of autonomous lethal systems pose challenges. Strategic competition in the cognitive domain, where narrative control may prove as decisive as battlefield outcomes.
Resilience and Adaptability
Future operational art will emphasize resilience in the face of cyber disruptions, hybrid threats, and narrative warfare. Strategists must anticipate escalation pathways and design flexible campaigns.
Conclusion
The evolution of operational art reflects an ongoing dialogue between classical wisdom and modern innovation. From Kautilya and Sun Tzu to Blitzkrieg, hybrid warfare, and multi-domain operations, the essence remains constant: aligning military means with political ends. In contemporary conflicts, where tactical actions can carry strategic weight and perception often rivals firepower, operational art must embrace both the cognitive and physical dimensions.
In the 21st century, the decisive edge will belong to those who can synthesize traditional principles with emerging innovations, leveraging both kinetic and non-kinetic means to achieve national objectives.
In the Indian context, its application extends beyond conventional war to deterrence, counterinsurgency, technology-enabled operations, and humanitarian response. Success depends not only on superior combat power but also on psychological dislocation, narrative control, and innovative leadership. As India faces a volatile neighborhood and rapid technological change, operational art will be central to shaping campaigns, deterring adversaries, and ensuring strategic advantage.
[i] Kautilya, The Arthshatra, Translated by Rangarajan L.N. 1992, Penguin Book, Gurgaon, India.
[ii] Sun Tzu. (5th Century BC). The Art of War. Translated by Giles Lionel 1910, Project Gutenberg, Luzac and Co. United Kingdom.
[iii] Jomini, A. H. (1838). Summary of the Art of War. Translated by Craighill and Ftendell, US Army, 1862.
[iv] Clausewitz, C. von. (1832). On War. translated by Graham J.J., 1874 (1st edition), 1909, London reprinting.
[v] Glantz, D. M. (1991). Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle. Frank Cass. First Edition, Taylor and Francis, London.
[vi] Freedman, L. (1981). The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. Palgrave Macmillan, London.
[vii] Petraeus, D. et al. (2006). FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. U.S. Army/Marine Corps.
[viii] Hoffman, F. (2007). Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Potomac Institute. Arlington, Virginea.
[ix] Asthana, S B. (2022), “Chinese active defence strategy translates to incremental encroachment strategy: what should India do?”, Economic Times, ET Government, August 14, 2022, [Online: Web] Accessed 10 May 2025, URL: https://government.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/governance/chinese-active-defence-strategy-translates-to-incremental-encroachment-strategy-what-should-india-do/93537035.
[x] Asthana, S B. (2019), “Decoding Chinese Strategy of Combating Three Evils”, Strategic Year Book, USI of India, Vij Books, India, Private Limited. ISBN:978-93-88161-53-4, pages 75-83. June 12, 2019, New Delhi. [Online: Web] Accessed 10 September 2025, URL: https://asthanawrites.org/2019/06/12/decoding-chinese-strategy-of-combating-three-evils/.
[xi] TRADOC (2018). “The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028”. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, US Army. Washington DC.
[xiii] Alberts, D. S., Garstka, J. J., & Stein, F. P. (1999). Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority. CCRP. National Defence University Press, Washigton DC.
[xiv] Sean McFate (2019). The New Rules of War: Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder, Harper Collin and Blackstone Publishing, New York.
[xv] Liddell Hart, B.H. (1967). Strategy. Praeger. New York.
[xvi] Asthana, S B. (2022), “Evaluating Strategies and Operational Art Applied by Parties to Russia-Ukraine War”, Kootneeti), April 19, 2022, [Online: Web] Accessed 10 September 2025, URL: https://thekootneeti.in/2022/04/19/evaluating-strategies-and-operational-art-applied-by-parties-to-russia-ukraine-war/
[xvii] Asthana, S B. (2024), “Strategies and Operational Art in one Year of Conflict: Israel vs Iran and Proxies”, Modern Diplomacy (EU), October 8, 2024, [Online: Web] Accessed 10 September 2025, URL: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/10/08/strategies-and-operational-art-in-one-year-of-conflict-israel-vs-iran-and-proxies/.
[xviii] Asthana, S B. (2025), “Operation Sindoor: The blending of operational art, kinetic force and strategic messaging”, Economic Times, ET Government, July 15, 2025, [Online: Web] Accessed 10 September 2025, URL: https://government.economictimes.indiatimes.com/blog/operation-sindoor-indias-strategic-response-to-terrorism-and-hybrid-warfare/122476601
(The views expressed are personal views of the author, who retains the copy right. The author is a Globally acknowledged Strategic and Security Analyst, He can be reached at Facebook and LinkedIn as Shashi Asthana, @asthana_shashi on twitter, and personnel site https://asthanawrites.org/ email shashiasthana29@gmail.com LinkedIn Profile www.linkedin.com/in/shashi-asthana-4b3801a6. Youtube link https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCl50YRTBrOCVIxDtHfhvQDQ?view_as=subscriber
Asthana Writes 